The Principal Agent Model and the European Union

This book assesses the use and limitations of the principal-agent model in a context of increasingly complex political systems such as the European Union. Whilst a number of conceptual, theoretical and methodological challenges need to be addressed, the authors show that the principal-agent model can still provide deeper insights into a wide range of political phenomena. Through an empirical analysis of multiple principal-agent relations in the EU, covering a variety of policy fields and political actors, the volume refines our theoretical understanding of the politics of delegation and discretion in the EU. It will appeal to scholars in interested in EU politics and policy, public administration and governance, and international organisations. The chapter ‘Multiple principals preferences, different types of oversight mechanisms, and agent’s discretion in trade negotiations’ is published open access under a CC BY 4.0 license via link.springer.com.

Introduction. Use and Limitations of the Principal–Agent Model in Studying the European Union Delreux, Tom (et al.) Pages 1-34 The Principal–Agent Model, Accountability and Democratic Legitimacy Brandsma, Gijs Jan (et al.) Pages 35-54 Non-exclusive delegation to the European External Action Service Dijkstra, Hylke Pages 55-81 Designing a Collective Agent for Trilogues in the European Parliament Laloux, Thomas Pages 83-103 Agent Interaction as a Source of Discretion for the EU High Representative Helwig, Niklas Pages 105-129 Impact of the Agent’s Environment on Discretion in the Field of EU Conflict Resolution Plank, Friedrich (et al.) Pages 131-155 Manifest and Latent Control on the Council by the European Council Kroll, Daniela Annette Pages 157-180 Effects of Contestation Within a Collective Agent in EU Trade Policy-Making Gastinger, Markus Pages 181-202 Multiple Principals’ Preferences, Types of Control Mechanisms and Agent’s Discretion in Trade Negotiations Conceição-Heldt, Eugénia Pages 203-226 Agents as Information Asymmetry Managers in EU Trade Policy-Making Coremans, Evelyn (et al.) Pages 227-253 Process-Tracing as a Tool to Analyse Discretion Reykers, Yf (et al.) Pages 255-281 Conclusion. Opportunities and Challenges for the Principal–Agent Model in Studying the European Union Adriaensen, Johan (et al.)