Independence and Legitimacy in the Institutional System of the European Union

As EU non-majoritarian bodies such as the European Commission, the Court of Justice of the European Union, and the European Central Bank grow in political influence, many have identified the pressing need to keep these bodies accountable to the repositories of the EU's democratic legitimacy. This collection of essays sheds light on the inherent tension between independence and legitimacy in the EU's institutional system and explores the options of reconciling the two. Featuring analysis from both legal and political perspectives, the volume assesses whether, to what extent, and how it is possible to control the various EU independent bodies and make them answerable for what they do, while at the same time upholding their independence.

Introduction 1: Jean-Paul Jacqué: Lost in Transition: The European Commission between Intergovernmentalism and Integration 2: Renaud Dehousse: The Politics of Delegation in the European Union 3: Dominique Ritleng: The Independence and Legitimacy of the European Court of Justice 4: Chiara Zilioli: The Independence of the European Central Bank and Its Banking Supervisory Competences 5: Giorgio Monti: Independence, Interdependence and Legitimacy: The EU Commission, National Competition Authorities, and the European Competition Network 6: Ellen Vos: EU Agencies and Independence